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I. INTRODUCTION
In a written request to Great Britain for General Augusto Pinochet's
extradition, Spain described some of the acts alleged to have been committed
under his command of Chile from 1973 to 1990.' Spain's description of the
torture endured in Chile revealed
The most usual method was 'the grill' consisting of a metal
table on which the victim was laid naked and his extremities
tied and electrical shocks were applied to the lips, genitals,
wounds, or metal prosthesis; also two persons, relatives or
friends, were placed in two metal drawers one on top of the
other so that when the one above was tortured the psychologi-
cal impact was felt by the other; on other occasions the victim
was suspended from a bar by the wrists and/or the knees, and
over a prolonged period while held in this situation electric
current was applied to him, cutting wounds were inflicted or
he was beaten; orthe'dry submarine' method was applied, i.e.
placing a bag on the head until close to suffocation, also drugs
were used and boiling water was thrown on various detainees
to punish them as a foretaste for the death which they would
later suffer.'
From October 1998 until March 2000, the British courts and government
were the focal point of the highly publicized international debate on whether
General Pinochet should be extradited to Spain by Great Britain for crimes
against humanity committed in Chile. The case against Pinochet led the
Divisional Court of Britain and the House of Lords to render several rulings
dealing with the issues of immunity and extraditable offenses.
• J.D. 2001, The University of Georgia.
See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998]
3 W.L.R. 1456.
2 Id. at 1503.
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As a result of the extradition proceedings, the House of Lords advanced
international human rights laws by strengthening the "emerging obligation in
international law to investigate and impart justice on those former heads of
state guilty of committing ... crimes against humanity in light of the growing
acceptance of universal jurisdiction."3 By recognizing the importance of
universal jurisdiction, the British courts helped to set the standard that there
could be prosecution of "dictators and leaders of repressive regimes by courts
in countries where the alleged abuses did not occur."4 Furthermore, the British
courts set another precedent by not granting immunity for former heads of state
when charged with crimes against humanity committed under their command. 5
The British courts, however, also demonstrated the need for further
advancement in international law so that the global community can have the
authority to stop crimes against humanity. Pinochet's regime tortured
thousands of victims from 1973 to 1990. Yet, in March of 1999, the House of
Lords ruled that Pinochet could legally be extradited to Spain solely for acts of
torture or conspiracy to torture that occurred after December 1988.6 The Lords
reasoned that Great Britain, Spain, and Chile had not all become parties to the
International Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment Act of 1984 (Convention Against Torture
Act)7 until December 1988.8 The United Nations adopted the Convention
Against Torture Act in 1984, as an effort to strengthen the already existing
custom of international law to outlaw torture and other inhumane treatment.9
Customary international law stems from the "general practice of states which
is accepted and observed as law, i.e. from a sense of legal obligation,"'" and
' Jamison G. White, Note, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere tofHide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal
Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a Wake-Up Callfor Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
127, 131 (1999).
4 Warren Hoge, Britain'sHigh Court Supports MovetoReleasePinochet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2000, at A8.
sSee id.
6 See Regina v. Bow St Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999]
2 W.L.R. 827, 828.
7 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
8 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 828.
9 See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988).
'0 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS As CUSTOMARY LAW 3
(1989).
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thus, the outlawing of torture by the international community was custom by
the 1970s.
This Recent Development will explore Great Britain's treatment of
international law through the use of its national legal system, analyze what
went wrong with the Pinochet extradition, and suggest improvements of the
process for the future.
First, Pinochet's use of torture in Chile will be explored briefly along with
Spain's request for Pinochet's extradition and the legal procedural history in
Great Britain dealing with the torture allegations against him. Second,
customary international law and the conventions and treaties recognized during
Pinochet's regime in Chile will be discussed in the context of the House of
Lords' initial decision in November 1998. Although this decision denied
Pinochet immunity, it represented a narrow construction, for it looked to
British national law in determining how to implement international law. Third,
the House of Lords' second decision in March 1999, granting Pinochet partial
immunity for the crimes occurring before the 1988 ratification of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture, reiterates this narrow construction of
international law. International law was given effect only when directly
enacted into British national law. Fourth, the Extradition Act of 1989 also
indicates that Britain's national law outweighs international law of universal
jurisdiction especially in light of the fact that Home Secretary Jack Straw had
discretion to decide whether Pinochet would be extradited to Spain. Finally,
individual national legal systems do not provide the best forum in which to
address international crimes against humanity such as torture. Each national
legal system's application of universal jurisdiction varies according to how
each nation incorporates international customary law, treaties, and conventions.
This variation in application has the potential to lead to inconsistencies in the
implementation of what should be uniform international law.
H. PINOCHET'S REGIME IN CHILE AND THE LEGAL
PROCEDURES AGAINST HIM IN GREAT BRITAIN
A. General Augusto Pinochet's Regime in Chile
On September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet led a military junta to
overthrow Chile's president, Salvador Allende. Within the first three months
of the Pinochet regime, "13,500 people were arrested with perhaps 1,500
killed."" From studies conducted by the National Commission on Truth and
, Nehal Bhuta, Note, Justice Without Borders? Prosecuting General Pinochet, 23 MELB.
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Reconciliation, 2 "the armed forces and security forces were responsible for the
deaths of 2,115 Chileans in the years following the 1973 coup as well as the
systematic torture or imprisonment of thousands of other opponents."' 3
The Chileans were kept in constant fear by the secret police, known as the
National Intelligence Directorate (D.I.N.A.), which directly reported to
Pinochet. 4 Pinochet instructed the D.I.N.A., who were specially trained in
torture techniques and had access to secret torture chambers, to eliminate
political adversaries." To protect military officials and the government from
involvement in the human rights abuses that occurred from 1973 until 1978,
Chile enacted an amnesty act. 6 In the 1980s, the National Information Center
(CNI) replaced D.I.N.A. and continued to conduct crimes of torture to further
oppress Pinochet's opposition.
By December of 1989, Chile made the transition back to democracy.
Although no longer president, Pinochet remained the commander-in-chief of
the army until March 1998, at which time he appointed himself Senator for life
so that he would be given immunity from any prosecution in Chile. 7
B. The Legal Procedures Against Pinochet in Great Britain
In September of 1998, Pinochet traveled to Great Britain to undergo minor
back surgery. During the two years prior to this trip, Judge Garzon of Spain
conducted an investigation of torture crimes in Chile.' Judge Garzon filed
international warrants with Great Britain in October of 1998 for Pinochet to
U. L. REv. 499, 507 (1999).
"z The National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Commission) inquired into
the human rights abuses from 1973 to 1990. See Adrian J. English & Scott D. Tollefson,
National Security, in CHILE: A COUNTRY STUDY 292, 295 (Rex A. Hudson ed., 3d ed. 1994).
"S Id. at xxxvii.
14 See id. at 52.
'3 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1463, 1503.
16 See English & Tollefson, supra note 12, at 292. See also Bhuta, supra note 11, at 509
(stating that the Amnesty Law of 1978 was upheld by the Chilean Supreme Court in 1990 as
being constitutional).
17 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MIcH. L. REV. 2129, 2133 (1999). On August 8, 2000, the Chilean Supreme
Court held that Pinochet no longer has immunity for the seventeen years in which he committed
acts of torture. This development could lead to prosecution of Pinochet in Chile. See Chile
Revokes Pinochet's Immunity (visited Nov. 15, 2000) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/world/americas/A56419-2000Aug8.html> (on file with author).
See Hazel Fox, The First Pinochet Case: Immunity of a Former Head of State, 48 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 207, 207-08 (1999).
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stand trial in Spain for the torture and murder of Spanish and Chilean citizens
in Chile.' 9
Great Britain determined that Pinochet had a prima facie case to answer in
the extradition proceedings against him. Under Great Britain's Extradition Act
of 1989,20 Pinochet could be extradited to Spain if the alleged offense against
the requesting state (Spain) would also be an offense under British law. 21 The
warrant against Pinochet for torture crimes used to silence Chilean political
opposition fell within the boundaries of the Extradition Act. Great Britain,
Spain, and Chile all ratified the Convention AgainstTorture Act in 1988, which
allowed for the enforcement of universal jurisdiction for crimes against
humanity such as torture. The Convention Against Torture Act was imple-
mented by British Parliament in Section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act22
whereby "torture by a public official or person acting in a public capacity
became a criminal offense in the U.K. after September 29, 1988, no matter
where it took place."'
In October of 1998, Pinochet moved for the Divisional Court to quash the
warrant. He claimed immunity as Chile's head of state at the time of the
alleged crimes, and the court agreed that he should be granted immunity.24 On
appeal, the House of Lords2 voted to reverse the lower court decision and
stripped Pinochet of immunity, since crimes against humanity do not constitute
the normal acts of a head of state.26 This ruling was annulled in December of
1998.27
" See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 2133.
20 See Extradition Act, 1989, § 12 (Eng.).
2 See Fox, supra note 18, at 209.
2 Criminal Justice Act, 1988, § 134(1) (Eng.).
' John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, House of Lords Rules that Crimes of Torture Allegedly
Committed During Pinochet Regime in Chile are Extraditable to Extent They Occurred After
Ratification of Torture Convention by Chile, Spain, and UnitedKingdom in Late 1988; Head-of-
State Immunity Held Inapplicable to Torture Charges as Jus Cogens Offenses, 5 INT'L L.
UPDATE 41 (1999).
24 See id.
2 The House of Lords is the final court of appeal in civil and criminal matters from all
courts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and all lower court decisions are bound by its
precedent. See PENNY DARBYSHIRE, EDDEY ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 160 (1992).
26 See John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, In 3 to 2 Vote British House of Lords Reverses
Ruling that General Pinochet was Immune from Extradition to Spain, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 129
(1998).
27 One of the law lords who voted against Pinochet was linked to contributing to Amnesty
International, a human or rights group campaigning against Pinochet's claim of immunity. See
Pinochetfor Beginners (visited Sept. 18,1999) <http://www.remember-chile.org.uk/beginners/
index.htm>.
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The House of Lords then reheard Pinochet's case. They voted in March of
1999, that Pinochet was not entitled to absolute immunity, and his arrest was
lawful.' They granted Pinochet partial immunity because they did not hold
him accountable for charges of human rights abuses prior to Great Britain's
ratification of the Convention Against Torture Act on September 29, 1988.
The charges by Spain remaining against Pinochet were torture and conspiracy
to commit torture that occurred after December 1988, when the Convention
Against Torture Act had been ratified by Great Britain, 9 Spain, and Chile.
The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, continued the extradition proceedings.
He considered whether to extradite Pinochet based on the Extradition Act,
which required him to balance whether the offenses were trivial or occurred a
long time ago, the accusations were made in good faith, or if the extradition be
inhumane or unjust.30 After the Deputy Chief Magistrate, Ronald Bartle, ruled
that Pinochet could legally be extradited to Spain,31 Straw once again
considered whether to extradite Pinochet. Pinochet's attorneys pleaded for
Straw to allow him to return to Chile based on his ill health over the past year.32
Straw ordered a team of doctors to examine Pinochet.33 While the medical
records were not made public, Straw stated that the doctors determined that
Pinochet was senile and could not make coherent statements, due to brain
damage from his previous strokes.' Straw's final decision allowed Pinochet
to go back home to Chile and to forego extradition to Spain, since he was
medically unfit to stand trial. 5
2" See Scan D. Murphy, Extradition of Chilean Former President Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 487,488 (1999).
29 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 2138.
30 See Joshua Rozenberg, The Home Secretary Jack Straw's Decision to Allow Extradition
Proceedings Against General Pinochet to Go Ahead (visited on Sept. 18, 1999) <http://news6.
thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid%5F231000/231438.san>.
"' See British Magistrate Clears Way for Pinochet Extradition, (visited on Oct. 8, 1999)
<http://cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9910/08/britain.pinochet.03/>.
32 See Pinochet not Behind Human RightsAbuses, His Lawyers Say (visited on Oct. 8,1999)
<http://cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9909/27/pinochet.05/>.
" See Ewen MacAskill, How Chile Pleaded for Its Ex-dictator (visited Jan. 13, 2000)
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/0001/14/world/world7.html>.
34 See id.
See Michael Byers, The Law and Politics ofthe Pinochet Case, 10 DUKEJ.COMP.&INT'L
L. 415,438 (2000).
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lI. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Customary International Law
To understand the House of Lords decisions, the customary international
law of the 1970s and 1980s should be examined to determine if international
law was violated in the earlier years of Pinochet's regime. The original and
oldest source of international law is custom. 3 International custom is evidence
of a general practice accepted as law in the states because these certain actions
are "obligatory or right." 37 Custom usually takes time to develop from
evolving rules of law that eventually are recognized as "obligatory or right" to
be followed by all states in the international community.38 The standard
elements of customary international law are "(1) uniformity of state practice,
(2) generality of state practice, and (3) the sense that state practice is required
by law," which "may thus be reduced to two primary components: the
objective practice of states and the subjective belief motivating this practice. 39
Under customary international law, a state can grant extradition for any crime
that it deems appropriate. 4° States usually will extradite for crimes that they
regard as serious offenses.
Another custom that should be considered is "double criminality." This
custom, followed by many states, sets forth that "extradition is only granted in
respect of a deed which is a crime according to the law of the state which is
asked to extradite, as well as of the state which demands extradition."' The
Extradition Act of 1989 implemented the custom of double criminality into
Great Britain's national law. Under another custom in international law, the
courts of the state requesting extradition do not have to determine whether the
defendant committed the crimes. The courts merely review the evidence to
determine if a prima facie case exists for which the defendant must answer at
trial in the requesting state.42
36 See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
17 Id. at 26-27.
"See id. at 30.
'9 Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions and
the Duty to Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1999).
40 See OPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, at 957.
", Id. at 958. This custom played an important role in the House of Lords decisions
concerning what crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet are extraditable.
42 See id. at 958. Again, this custom was followed by the House of Lords as they determined
whether Pinochet had a case to answer for in Spain without determining ifPinochet was actually
involved in the alleged crimes.
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Widely recognized in customary international law are "peremptory
norms."' A peremptory norm of international law " '[is] accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted.' "" A peremptory norm has more force in
international law than do customary rules or treaties.4" A peremptory norm is
not to be overruled by local custom because it is designed to produce a
deterrent effect requiring that all nations stay true to its authority.
46
For human rights protection, "it is widely accepted that customary law
contains preemptory norms that prohibit the types of acts committed in
Chile-disappearances, torture, and summary executions."' 7 Chile accepts that
the international law prohibiting torture is a preemptory norm.' The Chilean
government, therefore, violated peremptory norms when engaging in these acts
and should be held liable under international law for these violations.
Customary law also traditionally recognizes a grant of immunity to heads
of state or former heads of state for carrying out official acts which might
otherwise violate international law. This exception, however, requires that (1)
this person be a head of state, and that (2) the act be carried out in the course
of duties recognized as official acts.' 9 Customary law also provides a current
head of state with immunity from criminal prosecution under international
law." There is not a clear customary international rule, however, on whether
a crime violating international law withdraws this status of immunity from a
former head of state.5 The lack of a definite rule creates a problem of
interpretation for national courts in determining when a former head of state
should be granted or denied immunity for past actions that may have violated
international law.
4' Robert J. Quinn, Note, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants ofAmnestyfor the
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 905,
921 n.92 (1994).
4 White, supra note 3, at 155 (quoting Hilao v. Macos, 25 F.3d. 1467, 1471 n.6 (9th Cir.
1994)).
41 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 841.
4 See id.
41 Quinn, supra note 43, at 921-22 n.92.
41 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 841.
4" See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1465 (holding that an exception for
official acts applies to state actors).
'0 See id. at 1501.
" See id. at 1473-74.
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B. Conventions, Treaties, and Other Laws Recognized Before 1988
In 1948, the United Nations created the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, where the member states pledged themselves to uphold the standard
"that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."52 As a founding
member of the UN, Chile had a duty to abide by this declaration." Under
Article Three, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person,"
and under Article Five, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."'"
Although the Universal Declaration outlawed torture thirty years before
Pinochet's regime took control, Pinochet's regime ignored it, using torture to
silence its political opposition. The Amnesty Law of 1978, which was created
under the military government in Chile, granted immunity to all state and
military officials who participated in the disappearances and torture acts
perpetrated from 1973 to 1978." Because those involved likely recognized
that they were committing punishable crimes against humanity, they granted
themselves amnesty. This amnesty, however, should not apply to universal
jurisdiction and the violation of international law. Pinochet openly com-
manded a violation of international law by the use of torture to maintain control
over his government. He should not be allowed to create an amnesty act that
overrides international law.
The Pinochet regime also violated the 1948 Geneva Conventions and the
1978 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 6 These conventions
protected personal liberty and due process, rights included in Chile's
constitutions, but ignored by the Pinochet regime's acts of torture and
disappearances." Under the Geneva Conventions, there is no amnesty for
wartime crimes.
Thus, customary international law and the conventions enacted prior to and
during the Pinochet regime prohibited torture and defined it as an international
crime. In fact, the British House of Lords recognized this argument in both the
52 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. AI RES 1217
A(III)
" See id.
S4 id.
's See Edward C. Snyder, TheDirtyLegal War: Human Rights and the Rule ofLaw in Chile
1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253, 264 (1995) (describing the ways Pinochet's
regime avoided liability for disappearances and torture).
56 See Status of Inter-American Human Rights Agreements, 36 I.L.M. 229 (1997).
57 See Snyder, supra note 55, at 264.
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November 1998 and March 1999 decisions in their consideration of the issues
of immunity and extraditable crimes."'
C. The United Kingdom Becomes a Forum for International Law
From the very beginning of the United Kingdom's analysis of the Pinochet
extradition issue, the House of Lords recognized that "the capacity to prosecute
Pinochet in national courts is not commonplace."59 The House of Lords looked
to English national law in deciding how to implement international law.' In
their decision, the Lords considered the issue of "how fast to push the
development of the [customary] law." 1 The Lords were divided on their views
of international law and universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.
They "were merely construing a British jurisdictional statute" with "their
interpretation of the statute ... [being] informed by a reading of international
law.6 2 Thus, the House of Lords narrowed the application of the decision
rather than grant an outright victory for human rights under international law.
They used British law informed by international law rather than customary
international law allowing for universal jurisdiction.
D. The House of Lords' November 1998 Pinochet Ruling
1. The Majority's View
After the Divisional Court upheld Pinochet's immunity as a former head of
state for the offenses alleged in Spain's international warrants for extradition,
the House of Lords reversed that decision by a three to two vote. The main
issue discussed in the November 1998 decision was whether Pinochet should
be granted immunity. Pinochet argued that he was entitled to immunity under
customary international law and the State Immunity Act of 1978, as read with
the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964.63
The majority held that the State Immunity Act of 1978 did not apply to
criminal proceedings. Thus, since the extradition proceeding dealt with
criminal charges, there was no issue upon which the State Immunity Act could
s' See generally Ruth Wedgwood, Pinochet and International Law, II PACE INT'L L. REV.
287, 293 (1999) (describing British Parliamentary debates on the Pinochet Regime).
59 Id.
6o See id. at 297.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1457.
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grant Pinochet immunity." The majority also held that when section twenty
of the State Immunity Act was read in conjunction with schedule one of the
Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964, immunity could be granted for a head of
state performing official acts. They determined, however, that "the crimes of
torture... [fall] outside what international law would regard as functions of a
head of state."' 5
The majority applied identical reasoning in its analysis of Pinochet's
argument for immunity under customary international law. The majority
focused on whether Pinochet should have immunity as a former head of state.
All three Lords of the majority agreed that there was no clear authority on
whether customary international law granted immunity to a former head of
state.' Further, the majority determined that to be eligible for statutory
immunity, the former head of state had to be performing official acts, and the
majority delineated the requisite criteria for an act to be deemed "official" in
nature.67 In drawing this line, the majority examined the issue of whether the
municipal law of Chile or the principles of customary international law should
determine these criteria."
The majority chose to use the rules of international law. Lord Steyn argued
that "the development of international law since the second world warjustifies
the conclusion that by the 1973 coup d'6tat, and certainly ever since,
international law condemned... torture... and crimes against humanity...
as international crimes deserving of punishment."' 9 Therefore, the offenses
alleged by Spain to have been committed under the orders of Pinochet could
not be deemed to be official acts. The majority concluded that there was no
immunity of any kind that could be granted to Pinochet. Thus, this majority
opinion seemed to abide by the customs of international law without putting an
undue emphasis on national law.
2. The Minority's View
The two minority Lords gave lengthy opinions on why the immunity should
be granted to Pinochet. Lord Slynn emphasized the far-reaching implications
of this decision. He stated that the Lords were not "concerned only with this
applicant," but were "concerned on the arguments advanced with a principle
64 See id.
65 Id.
6 See id. at 1501, 1503.
67 See id. at 1505.
6S See id.
' Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1506.
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which will apply to all heads of state and all alleged crimes under international
law." 0 This perspective revealed the cautious application of international law
in this opinion. The minority agreed with the majority that the State Immunity
Act of 1978 did not apply to criminal proceedings or expressly deal with the
position of a former head of state.7
The minority focused on rejecting the majority's view that the functions of
a head of state must be defined by international law rather than by national law.
Lord Slynn claimed that international law did not list the functions considered
to be official acts of head of state. He argued that the role of a head of state
differs among nations.7 Lord Slynn conceded that international law does not
recognize torture as an official act of a head of state. Yet, he rejected the
conclusion that if a head of state commits an illegal act, then he is no longer
carrying out one of his functions and thus loses immunity with respect to those
criminal acts.'
The minority conceded that more states now recognize a category of crimes
not covered by head of state immunity. Lord Slynn, however, concluded this
movement was still in its earliest stages of development and therefore, did not
represent a general consensus that "all crimes against international law should
be justiciable in national courts on the basis of the universality of
jurisdiction."'74 He stressed that no universal definition of crimes against
humanity existed, and that states should be cautious in examining this issue.
Without long established customary international law in this area, he did not
want to subject a former head of state to a trial of international law crimes
within another state. 7 He was not in agreement with the proposition that
"international crimes are outside the protection of the immunity respect of
former heads of state."'76 Further, he disagreed with the concept of universal
jurisdiction and stressed that national judges should proceed carefully in their
debate of this concept.'
Even the language of the Convention Against Torture Act did not convince
the minority that Pinochet should be denied immunity for acts of torture.
While recognizing that the Convention Against Torture Act involved public
officials, allowed extradition, and constituted national law in Chile, Spain, and
70 Id. at 1460.
71 See id. at 1465.
7 See id. at 1468.
7 See id.
74 Id. at 1473.
' See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1473.
76 Id. at 1474.
v See id.
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the United Kingdom, the minority viewed it as unclear. The minority claimed
that it did not explicitly determine whether immunity should be taken away.
Moreover, it felt that a national court should not interpret whether the
Convention Against Torture Act meant for immunity to be taken away from a
head of state, particularly because the term "public official" was too vague to
determine whether it included a head of state.7'
Lord Berwick's minority opinion also attacked the Convention Against
Torture, contrasting it with the Genocide Convention. He stated that the
Genocide Convention was clear in expressing no immunity for a head of
state.79 When it was adopted at British law, however, the British law left that
portion out so that immunity for heads of state was upheld. Thus, he concluded
that if the Convention Against Torture Act had clearly contained a prohibition
on head of state immunity, then Parliament would most likely have incorpo-
rated immunity into the statute as it did with the Genocide Convention."
The minority hesitated in directly applying international law because it did
not view the British court system as an international court. Lord Berwick
explained, "We apply customary international law as part of the common law,
and we give effect to our international obligations so far as they are incorpo-
rated in our statute law, but we are not an international court."'" The minority
wanted to narrowly apply international law. They argued that this type of case
did not belong in a national court system but would be better suited for an
international court system.
The Convention Against Torture Act was adopted into the British legal
system through section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988. This act
defines "torture" as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person" by "the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official."82 In Article Four of
the Convention Against Torture Act, each state party agrees to make torture
and conspiracy to commit torture criminal offenses that must be punished."
The minority did not construe this language as universal jurisdiction. Yet, it
used this language to deny Pinochet immunity because torture cannot be
considered an official act of a head of state under customary international law
or the Convention Against Torture Act. This Act also gives the state parties an
explicit duty to initiate criminal proceedings against persons guilty of torture.
718 See id. at 1476-78.
79 See id. at 1488.
go See id.
S Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1495.
n Convention Against Torture, art. 1, para. 1.
u See id.
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Thus, the state parties do not have the right to pass amnesty laws that protect
torturers from prosecution."
Overall, the decision by the House of Lords set an important precedent in
international law, even though narrowly applied under their national law. The
House of Lords ruled that "heads of state cannot claim statutory immunity for
crimes under international law, such as torture and crimes against humanity."'
This decision, however, was annulled as a result of one majority law lord's
association with Amnesty International, a group promoting the extradition of
Pinochet for crimes against humanity." Thus, the House of Lords would have
another chance to review the case and determine how to apply international
law. The result would be that the minority's narrow view of national law
incorporating international law would prevail over the majority view of directly
applying international law.
E. The House of Lords March 1999 Ruling
In this decision, the House of Lords placed more emphasis on the issue of
extradition and the crimes for which Pinochet could be extradited. By the time
this rehearing came before the House of Lords, Spain specified the charges
against Pinochet as torture, conspiracy to torture, conspiracy to murder,
attempted murder, and murder.87 The majority held that under Section Two of
the Extradition Act of 1989, double criminality applied so that the crime had
to be a crime in England and a crime in Spain at the time the alleged offense
occurred.88 Extraterritorial torture was not a crime in England until September
29,1988, when England incorporated the Convention Against Torture Act into
its legal system through section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act. Thus, the
alleged offenses of torture and conspiracy to torture, and murder and
conspiracy to murder occurring in Chile before that date were not crimes for
which Pinochet could be extradited." The House of Lords paid no heed that
under customary international law, Pinochet's alleged acts of torture could be
punished in both the U.K. and Spain by universal jurisdiction.
Therefore, the House of Lords granted partial immunity to Pinochet. The
majority held that the State Immunity Act of 1978 granted a former head of
"See Schabacker, supra note 39, at 27.
A Half-Closed Case: Pinochet Will Leave Questions Behind if He Flies Home, TIMES
(London), Jan. 13, 2000, at 25.
u See Pinochetfor Beginners, supra note 27.
"7 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 828.
' See id.
89 See id.
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state immunity for official acts. The Lords recognized that torture was an
international crime, but that it did not become punishable by universal
jurisdiction until the Convention Against Torture Act." The Lords reasoned
that since Chile, Spain, and the United Kingdom had all made the Convention
Against Torture part of their respective national legal systems by December 8,
1988, then Pinochet could not claim immunity for acts of torture after that
date.9 Thus, since the worst acts of torture occurred in the 1970s, Pinochet
won a partial victory. Nonetheless, the Pinochet regime perpetrated enough
acts of torture and conspiracy to torture between 1988 and 1990 to keep the
extradition proceedings alive.
The House of Lords' decision to grant Pinochet partial immunity for acts
of torture occurring before the 1988 ratification of the Convention Against
Torture by Chile, Great Britain, and Spain was inaccurate. Torture was not
first outlawed in these countries by the Convention Against Torture. As stated
from a study of the Convention Against Torture Act:
Many people assume that the Convention's principal aim is to
outlaw torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. This assumption is not correct insofar as
it would imply that the prohibition of these practices is
established under international law by the Convention only
and that this prohibition will be binding as a rule of interna-
tional law only for those states which have become parties to
the Convention. On the contrary, the Convention is based
upon the recognition that the above-mentioned practices are
already outlawed under international law. The principle aim
of the Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition of
such practices by a number of supportive measures. 2
Under customary international law, these countries had already outlawed
torture. The Convention Against Torture Act was merely meant to strengthen
customary international law, not necessarily to establish the illegality of torture.
The Convention Against Torture Act emphasized the responsibility of public
officials or those acting in an official capacity by holding them accountable for
violating the customary international lawprohibiting the use of torture. 93 Thus,
90 See id.
91 See id.
91 BURGERS & DANELIUs, supra note 9, at 1.
93 See id.
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the House of Lords wrongly placed more emphasis on the date that the
Convention Against Torture Act became effective in British national law rather
than on the fact that customary international law outlawed torture for years
before the Pinochet regime was even established. They erred in granting
Pinochet immunity for the years between 1973 to 1988.
In this decision, the House of Lords applied a narrow view of international
law, making it applicable only when enacted directly in their national law.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted that since the Nuremberg trials, international
law has recognized international crimes." During the Nuremberg trials, the
International Military Tribunal found that individuals could be held account-
able for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace.95 The
House of Lords further recognized that the torture to which Chile admitted
violates a preemptory norm under customary international law." The House
of Lords, however, overlooked these issues. Instead, they focused on the
principle of double criminality to justify Pinochet's partial immunity because
torture outside Great Britain was not a crime under British law until September
1988. 7
Various Lords debated the issue of whether double criminality required the
conduct to be criminal under British law at the date it was committed or merely
criminal at the date of extradition." The majority of the Lords agreed that the
Extradition Act of 1989, Section Two, defines an extradition crime to be a
crime under double criminality for an offense at the conduct date of the offense
rather than the request date of extradition for the offense."
Among the Lords, there were those who did not doubt that torture was an
international crime before the Convention Against Torture. "0 But, their
argument included the view that there was no tribunal or court to punish this
international crime and universal jurisdiction was not recognized until the
Convention Against Torture Act.'0 ' Thus, the Lords declined to expand
international law beyond what they viewed to be the customary practice of
torture being under the local jurisdiction of the states within the preemptory
norm that torture was an international crime. The Lords viewed the goal of the
" See Regina v Bow St. Metro., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 832.
95 See ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1962).
"See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 841.
9 See id. at 832.
98 See id.
9 See id.
'00 See id. at 841.
1o1 See id.
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Convention Against Torture Act as now providing no safe haven for the
torturer within his local jurisdiction.'0 2
F. National Politics as the Final Factor in Deciding the Issue of Extradition
After the House of Lords held that Pinochet could legally be extradited to
Spain by Great Britain for torture crimes that occurred after 1988, Magistrate
Bartle determined that the extradition formalities were complied with because
Spain had legal charges and jurisdiction to try Pinochet. Yet, the ultimate
discretion on whether Pinochet would actually be sent to Spain was left to the
Home Secretary, Jack Straw.
Under Great Britain's Extradition Act, Straw had authority to not extradite
Pinochet if extradition would be inhumane or unjust.0 3 A government official
should not have this subjective determination concerning extradition in cases
dealing with violation of international law. Once again, national law
dominated over international law since the extradition proceedings concerning
the charges of torture were left to national political systems rather than a more
objective international forum.
G. The Need for an International Forum for Issues of International Law
From the outcome of the Pinochet extradition proceedings, the manner of
the enforcement of international law apparently has not finished developing.
Great Britain is an example of the problem of adjudicating international
criminal law primarily in national courts. Typically, national courts will decide
the question of whether an individual, an entity, or a government has
committed an international crime only as applied by its interpretation of
international law through its national law. " As international law continues to
develop,"5 there needs to be a formalization of the customary law, treaties, and
conventions of international law that is not reliant upon an interpretation of its
application under national law.
2 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 842.
103 See Extradition Act, supra note 20.
104 See ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, LEARNER'S GUIDE INTERNATIONAL LAW VIDEO COURSE 96
(1995).
'05 "Step by step over the last half-century, governments and international bodies have given
shape to public attitudes with a succession of agreements and conventions. Some define human
rights; others establish violations such as genocide and torture." Richard Blystone, Pinochet
Case a Defining Moment for International Law (visited Jan. 13, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/europe/9811/24/pinochet.legalities.>.
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A possible solution would be to form an International Criminal Court with
the purpose of dealing with the serious crimes against humanity such as torture.
The crimes would be recognized worldwide as being a violation of interna-
tional law. An example of how to establish this type of court can be seen by
the "ad hoc international criminal tribunal.., established by Security Council
resolution in 1993 to try individuals for violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991."'06
Instead of a lengthy process within a nation's legal system, an international
legal system should be established that would be uniform in applying an
international system of justice. An International Criminal Court has been
adopted and will become ratified and operational for the world community
upon sixty states becoming signatories.° 7 For this court to be successful, states
are in agreement that "the court should have jurisdiction only over individuals
and not states... initially, it should not be a standing body,... [and] that such
a court would assume jurisdiction only with the consent of the states' parties
and must guarantee due process, independence, and impartiality."' ' This type
of court, however, cannot be established until states are ready to let go of the
narrow view of implementing international law only through national law.
There also needs to be a plan of how those suspected of committing crimes
against humanity would be apprehended and where they would serve their
sentence if convicted by an international criminal court system.'09 Even though
Pinochet would not be "subject to the court's jurisdiction as it is non-retroac-
tive in nature," his case should be an example to study in addressing the issues
of universal jurisdiction and accountability for the repressive regimes and
torture crimes of dictators in the future. 10
IV. CONCLUSION
The Pinochet case serves as an example of why the International Criminal
Court needs to be ratified and effective worldwide. National courts are not the
'06 DEFEIS, supra note 104, at 97. A similar tribunal was established to cover war crimes in
Rwanda.
o See White, supra note 3, at 167.
o Defeis, supra note 104, at 96-97.
'o See id. at 97; see also UK to Propose Dropping Extradition Process-Paper (visited Oct.
18, 1999) <http://www.aol.com/mynews/news/story.adp-1999100903228499.html> (com-
menting on the British proposal at a forthcoming European Union summit on justice to abolish
extradition proceedings between EU member states. With the British proposal, Eurowarrants
could be used for the arrest of criminals that would be enforceable across the EU).
"Io White, supra note 3, at 167.
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best forums in which to try international crimes because politics and varying
interpretations of national law can affect the justice being sought under
international law. Since the 1940s, international law has recognized that
torture crimes and crimes against humanity should be outlawed. Thus, the
prohibition of torture and crimes against humanity became a preemptory norm
under international law. The House of Lords recognized that a peremptory
norm has the highest ranking among international law in order to have a
deterrent effect that all nations must stay true to its authority."1 ' Yet, they
chose to ignore it since national law did not have a way of punishing this norm
until the enactment of the Convention Against Torture Act.
National law should not determine the outcome of violations of interna-
tional law. The Pinochet case has helped international law by setting the
precedent of enforcement of universal jurisdiction from this point onward.
But, unfortunately, there may be no justice for the victims who suffered under
Pinochet's regime of torture. Their suffering should not be in vain, and we
should strive to reform by upholding international law without the infringe-
ments of individual national laws.
... See Regina v. Bow St. Metro., [19991 2 W.L.R. at 841.
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